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ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER ERISA: WHEN IS AN
AWARD APPROPRIATE?
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 1 like many federal regulatory statutes, 2 permits courts to
award attorney's fees to appropriate parties.3 These awards reimburse litigants for the cost of counsel, thus diminishing one of the
major obstacles to filing a suit. Unlike other statutes which permit
fee shifting, section 502(g)(1) 4 of ERISA does not indicate when
courts should make these awards. 5 Section 502(g)(1) states only
that "the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's
fee and costs of action to either party."' 6 Furthermore, "[tihe legis7
lative history of the Act furnishes no guidelines."
Presented with such unbridled discretion, the federal courts
have formulated divergent standards for attorney's fees requests
under ERISA. Most circuit courts have adopted a five-factor test to
assess whether to award fees to prevailing plaintiffs. However, the
courts have applied the standard with varying degrees of rigidity.
Other courts have adopted the approach of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Fees Act), 8 analogizing it to section
502(g)(1). Courts also have applied separate and conflicting standards to requests for fees from prevailing defendants and nonprevailing plaintiffs.
This Note concludes that an analogy to the Fees Act is inappropriate for prevailing plaintiffs because ERISA plaintiffs, unlike civil
rights plaintiffs, do not serve as private attorneys general. Courts
should apply section 502(g)(1) only to facilitate lawsuits that plaintiffs would not bring without a fee-shifting provision. However,
courts should apply the Fees Act approach for prevailing ERISA de1 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. (1982)).
2
See S. SPEISER, ATrORNEYS' FEES §§ 12.61-12.71 (1973) (listing statutes); Note,
Awards of Attomey's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 277, 320-23 (1982)
(same).
3 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1982).
4 Id.
5 In contrast, many other fee-shifting statutes award fees only to prevailing parties,
with some providing for mandatory rather than discretionary awards. See Note, supra
note 2, at 287, 321. ERISA itself has a mandatory fee-shifting provision in cases where
the plaintiff prevails under § 1145 of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D) (1982).
6
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1982).
7 American Communications Ass'n v. Retirement Plan for Employees of RCA
Corp., 507 F. Supp. 922, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).

1037

1038

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1037

fendants because both statutes seek to deter frivolous suits without
discouraging meritorious ones. In addition, each element of the
Eaves five-factor test9 is either inappropriate or superfluous in light
of equitable doctrines which allow fee shifting, section 502(g)(1)'s
function, and accepted rationales for fee shifting. Courts generally
should not approve awards to nonprevailing plaintiffs, but should
adopt a more flexible approach to allow awards when consistent
with section 502(g)(1)'s function. Courts should also create a new
standard for prevailing ERISA plaintiffs. Courts should first examine whether any equitable basis for awarding fees is applicable,
and then, if necessary, award attorney's fees under section 502(g)(1)
to plaintiffs who bring suit relying on the attorney's fees provision.
I
BACKGROUND

Several preliminary matters are important in understanding any
discussion of fee shifting. First, three classes of litigants may receive
awards of attorney's fees. Second, the American Rule of recovery
prohibits awards absent a statutory provision, unless specific equitable considerations apply. The Fees Act' 0 contains a typical fee-shifting provision, the one most often compared to section 502(g)(1).
Finally, although statutory and equitable doctrines permit courts to
shift attorney's fees, courts should shift fees only under a standard
that meets general fee-shifting rationales and ensures that awards
either encourage meritorious suits or deter frivolous ones.
Prevailing plaintiffs, prevailing defendants, and nonprevailing
plaintiffs" may request an award of attorney's fees. "Prevailing
plaintiff," not without controversy, is most often broadly interpreted
to mean a party who achieves success on any of the major issues of
the suit, or even a favorable settlement.' 2 A nonprevailing plaintiff
is one who fails to achieve success on any of the major issues in the
suit, and a prevailing defendant prevents the plaintiff from achieving
such success. Section 5 02(g)(1) permits courts to grant attorney's
' 13
fees to "a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.
Ordinarily, litigants in American courts pay their own attorney's
9 The Tenth Circuit promulgated this test in Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th
Cir. 1978).

10

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).

11 A nonprevailing defendant could never seriously hope courts would award him
attorney's fees.
12 See Note, Promotingthe Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards
Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 353-55 (1980); Note, The Scope of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act After Maine v. Thiboutot, Maher v. Gagne, and Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Consumers Union, 66 IowA L. REV. 1301, 1315-18 (1981).
'3
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1982).
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fees. 14 This "American Rule" contrasts with the English practice,
which generally allows prevailing parties to collect fees from their
opponents. 15 The Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society' 6 ensured the survival of the American
Rule. The Alyeska Court held that lower federal courts cannot award
attorney's fees absent specific statutory authorization, subject to
limited equitable exceptions. The bad faith and common fund doctrines, described by the Court as "unquestionably assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow attorney's fees in particular
situations, unless forbidden by Congress,"' 7 survived Alyeska.
Courts have historically had the power to shift attorney's fees to the
party that had conducted the litigation in bad faith. The bad faith
exception includes three types of abuses of the judicial system: "obdurate or obstinate conduct that necessitates legal action; bad faith
in propounding a frivolous claim, counterclaim, or defense; and
vexatious conduct occurring during the course of litigation."' 8
Under the common fund doctrine courts have long had the power in
equity to assess attorney's fees if a plaintiff's suit creates either a
common fund or some other common benefit to a wider class.' 9
This power rests upon the principle of unjust enrichment-the benefitting class did not help finance the legal action that produced the
20
benefit.
Statutory fee-shifting provisions authorize awards in the absence of equitable exceptions to the American Rule. The most well
known statutory fee-shifting provision is the Fees Act. The Fees Act
permits a court "in its discretion [to] allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs" in an action under the civil rights statutes. 21 Courts apply
14 Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (refusing to award fees absent
statutory authorization).
15 For background on and criticism of the opposing rules, see generally S. SPEISER,
supra note 2, at 618 (collecting cases affirming American Rule); Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel
Fees Be Allowed?, 26 CAL. ST. B.J. 107 (1951); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of
Litigation?, 49 IoWA L. REV. 75 (1963); Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on
Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984); Comment, FinancialBarriers to
Litigation: Attorney Fees and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 ALB. L. REV. 148 (1981).
16 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
17 Id. at 259.
18 Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Feesfor Abuses of theJudicial System, 61 N.C.L. REV. 613,
632 (1983).
19 See generally Berger, CourtAwardedAttorneys'Fees: What Is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 281, 295-301 (1977); Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Feesfrom
Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974).
For example, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), the plaintiffs
successfully brought a derivative suit for misleading proxy statements. The court
charged attorney's fees to the corporation, the lawsuit's actual beneficiary. Id. at 396-97.
20 See Berger, supra note 19, at 296.
21 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
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a bifurcated standard that separates plaintiffs from defendants when
assessing the appropriateness of an award under the Fees Act. The
Act's legislative history states that prevailing plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust." 22 Congress thus adopted a presumption, first articulated by the Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises,Inc., 23 in favor of fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs. The
private attorney general theory, which permits fee awards to plaintiffs who bring suit to vindicate their own constitutional or statutory
rights, 24 justifies the Newman presumption. Courts widely apply this
congressionally intended presumption under the Fees Act.2 5

It is more difficult for prevailing defendants to collect attorney's
fees from plaintiffs under the Fees Act, although the extent of the
difficulty varies. The legislative history states that in the case of a
defeated plaintiff, "if the action is not brought in bad faith, such fees
should not be allowed .... This standard will not deter plaintiffs
from seeking relief under these statutes, and yet will prevent their
being used for clearly unwarranted harassment purposes." 26 Congress thus intended that prevailing defendants should collect fees
only if the plaintiff acted in bad faith. The Supreme Court expanded the strict bad faith standard in ChristiansburgGarment Co. v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,2 7 a title VII case not under
the purview of the Fees Act. The ChristiansburgCourt announced a
new standard which permitted a prevailing defendant to collect attorney's fees if the plaintiff's claim, despite being in good faith, "was
22 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT],
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912 (quoting Newman v. Piggie

Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). In Newman, the Court said a civil rights
plaintiff acts "as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." 390 U.S. at 402.
23
390 U.S. 400 (1968).
24 SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 2-4, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5910-12. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text for a more detailed
discussion of the private attorney general theory.
25
See Note, supra note 2, at 325. There is, however, considerable controversy as to
what "special circumstances would render an award unjust." NoteJudidalDiscretion and
the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act: What Special CircumstancesRender an Award
Unjust?, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 320 (1982). For example, if a plaintiff is likely to recover
substantial monetary damages when the litigation commences, his ability to attract competent counsel on a contingent fee basis renders an award of fees unnecessary. See Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing factors court should
consider in deciding whether to shift attorney's fees), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
Other courts have held that they may only award fees to private attorneys general under
the Newman presumption. Thus, courts have denied attorney's fees in cases where the
action did not involve national priorities or constitutional concerns. See Martin v. Hancock, 466 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D. Minn. 1979); Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 433 F. Supp.
1369, 1370 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
26
H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976).
27 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
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frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." ' 28 In Hughes v. Rowe, 2 9 the
Court applied the Christiansburgstandard in a civil rights case to
which the Fees Act applied, noting only that it could "perceive no
30
reason for applying a less stringent standard" under the Fees Act.
Consequently, prevailing defendants must show that the plaintiff's
actions either were in bad faith or were frivolous to receive an award
3
under the Fees Act. '
Once a court establishes that fee shifting is permissible according to statutory authority or established doctrine, the court should
next inquire as to its desirability. According to this theory, any statute's standard for determining the appropriateness of a fees award
should, in addition to conforming to the intent of the legislature
which enacted it, be supported by an applicable fee-shifting rationale. The five major rationales that justify fee shifting are (1) general
indemnity, because prevailing parties should not have to bear the
costs of proving that they are right; (2) compensation for legal injury, because prevailing parties' damages awards should not, as a
matter of principle, be reduced by the amount of their legal fees; (3)
punitive, because culpable parties should pay a price for their malfeasance, and be deterred from so behaving in the future; (4) private
attorney general doctrine, because plaintiffs may more easily enforce important constitutional rights; and (5) affecting relative financial strengths of the parties, because fees generally may be shifted
when one side in a particular type of litigation regularly possesses
32
greater financial resources than the other.

Id. at 422.
449 U.S. 5 (1980).
30 Id. at 14. In Hughes the Court found the plaintiffis suit not frivolous. Id. The
Court thus denied the defendant's motion for fees without consideration of whether the
plaintiff brought his suit in bad faith. If in some future case the plaintiff's suit is frivolous but brought in good faith, the Court would then have to decide whether the bad
faith standard is better suited to the Fees Act.
31 The circuits are divided and inconsistent as to which standard applies. See E.
LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF A-rromREY's FFES 94-97 (1981); Note, supra note 2,
at 303 n.91.
32 Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J.
651, 653-65; accord Aero Corp. v. Department of the Navy, 558 F. Supp. 404, 429
(D.D.C. 1983) (awarding attorney's fees on the punitive rationale because of defendant's
bad faith); Breger, Compensation Formulasfor Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 250-53 (1984) (espousing similar theory with four rationales of fee
shifting); Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 65-67 (1984) (explaining wide acceptance of Rowe's rationales in Europe). Professor Rowe's sixth rationale employs an economic analysis to distinguish
between one-way fee-shifting statutes and the two-way statutes. This rationale is inapplicable to this Note, which deals only with a two-way statute.
28
29
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Interpretation of Section 502(g)(1) Under the Eaves FiveFactor Test

Neither the language of section 502(g)(1)3 3 nor ERISA's legislative history3 4 furnishes any guidance as to when courts should
award attorney's fees. Soon after litigation over section 502(g)(1)
reached the appellate level, the Tenth Circuit in Eaves v. Penn3 5
enunciated a now widely accepted3 6 five-factor test for deciding
whether prevailing plaintiffs should receive attorney's fees awards.
The district court in Eaves3 7 awarded attorney's fees to plan participants based on the common fund doctrine.3 8 The Tenth Circuit remanded, holding that to decide whether attorney's fees should be
taken from the common fund or from the culpable defendant, the
court should consider:
(1) the degree of the offending parties' culpability or bad faith; (2)
the degree of the ability of the offending parties to personally satisfy an award of attorneys fees; (3) whether or not an award of
attorneys fees against the offending parties would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) the amount of benefit
conferred on members of the pension plan as a whole; and (5) the
39
relative merits of the parties' position.
The Eaves court failed to explain why it would use or how it developed this test.
Nearly all circuits 40 have adopted the five-factor 4 ' test or a similar approach. However, courts do not currently employ the test to
determine whether the common fund doctrine applies, as in Eaves.
See supra text accompanying note 6.
See infra text accompanying note 90; supra text accompanying note 7.
587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
37
Eaves v. Penn, 426 F. Supp. 830, 838 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
38
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
39 Eaves, 587 F.2d at 465.
40
See Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251 (1st Cir. 1986); Miles v.
New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund Employee Pension
Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); Ursic v. Bethlehem
Mines, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Chicago Painters & Decorators Pension, Health
& Welfare, & Deferred Say. Plan Trust Funds v. Karr Bros., 755 F.2d 1285 (7th Cir.
1985); Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 749 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1984); McConnell v. MEBA
Medical & Benefits Plan, 778 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1985); Fine v. Semet, 699 F.2d 1091
(11 th Cir. 1983). See also Davidson v. Cook, 567 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Va. 1983) (adopting
five-factor test in district court of the Fourth Circuit, where no appellate case law on this
point currently exists), aftd, 734 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1984).
41
The five factors listed are not necessarily the only ones a court may consider, nor
is any one of them dispositive. See, e.g., Iron Workers Local 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d
1255, 1266 (5th Cir. 1980) (court should consider whether party would have violated
fiduciary duty by not bringing suit). They are, however, a common set of criteria considered by all courts which have adopted the test.
33
34
35
36
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Rather, courts apply the Eaves factors to every ERISA suit where
parties request attorney's fees. Even the Tenth Circuit has expressly
adopted this reading.4 2 Thus, the district courts in the circuits that
have adopted the Eaves test apply it on a case-by-case basis, 4 3 with
44
abuse of discretion providing the standard of review on appeal.
Only one court has directly rejected the use of the Eaves test.4 5
In Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Hitchings
Trucking, Inc., 4 6 the district court reasoned that "it is difficult to determine the relationship of ERISA to each of these factors .... [To
attempt to make the general rule anymore [sic] specific ... would
47
add needless strictures to what should be an easily applied rule."
The court analogized ERISA to the Fees Act and announced that
prevailing plaintiffs should always recover attorney's fees from the
defendant unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust.4 8 One circuit has neither expressly adopted nor rejected the
Eaves test.49 The District of Columbia Circuit has announced a simple standard of judicial discretion 50 without elaborating on the nature of the discretion it sanctioned.
B.

Application of Section 5 02(g)(1) According to the Fees Act
Analogy-Prevailing Parties

In addition to the Eaves test, some courts have attempted to develop a standard for fee shifting under section 502(g)(1) by analogizing it to the Fees Act. However, these courts have not uniformly
applied the Fees Act standard to ERISA suits. Although rejection of
42 "The Eaves criteria is [sic] an effective means of providing the guidance needed
by district courts to exercise their discretion under section 1 1 32(g)(1)." Gordon v.
United States Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 106, 109 (10th Cir. 1983).
43 See, e.g., Porcellini v. Strassheim Printing Co., 578 F. Supp. 605, 615-16 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
44 See, e.g., Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 452 (9th Cir. 1980).
45 Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Hitchings Trucking, Inc., 492
F. Supp. 906, 909 (E.D. Mich. 1980). The court rejected a four- rather than a five-factor
test. Id. However, the court used a four-factor test on the authority of Baeten v. Van
Ess, 474 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Wis. 1979), a decision which in turn cited Eaves as authority
for its test. Id. at 1332. For an explanation of why that court adopted only four factors,
see infra notes 144-48, 163-67 and accompanying text. The reasoning used by the Central States court, see infra text accompanying note 47, to reject the four-factor test is
equally applicable to the original five-factor test.
46 492 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (Sixth Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue).
47 Id. at 909 (citation omitted).
48 Id. For a description of the Fees Act and how it is analogized to § 502(g)(1), see
infra notes 51-73 and accompanying text.
49 On May 29, 1986, the First Circuit expressly adopted the Eaves test. Gray v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 258 (1st Cir. 1986). Prior to the Gray decision,
the First Circuit held only that an award under ERISA was "discretionary." Lodge v.
Shell Oil Co., 747 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1984).
50 Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 642 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 455 U.S. 72 (1982).
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the Fees Act analogy should presumably make it more difficult for
prevailing plaintiffs to receive awards, the distinction between acceptance and rejection of the analogy may have no practical import.
In circuits that reject the Fees Act analogy, every prevailing plaintiff's request for fees has been granted under the Eaves five-factor
test. Nevertheless, the difference retains theoretical significance because jurisdictions which apply only the Eaves test have greater capacity to deny fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs. Courts also differ
in their treatment of requests for awards by prevailing defendants.
1. PrevailingPlaintifs
Three circuits have held that the Fees Act approach should apply to ERISA suits, and have thus followed the Newman presumption
that a prevailing plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's
fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." 5 1 If the jurisdiction has also adopted the Eaves test, the five
factors are reduced to mere formalities recited to justify an almost
automatic award for every prevailing plaintiff. In McConnell v. MEBA
Medical & Benefits Plan,52 the Ninth Circuit recognized this phenomenon, stating that "proper consideration of the [five] factors will invariably lead to the conclusion that a prevailing plan participant or
beneficiary should recover attorneys' fees." 5 3 The court held that
the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's request for fees, because "no special circumstances exist[ed] warranting the denial." '5 4 Thus, the court held the district court's balancing
of the Eaves factors in favor of the defendant irrelevant absent unusual circumstances demonstrating an improper award.
Two other circuits have adopted both the Newman presumption
and the Eaves test without reaching the conclusion of the McConnell
court. 55 Because McConnell demonstrates that a stringent application of the five-factor test is inconsistent with the Newman presumption favoring fee awards, courts in these jurisdictions must not
accord substantial weight to the five factors in their analysis of fee
56
award requests.
51
52
53

Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
759 F.2d 1401, supreseded, 778 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1985).
759 F.2d at 1406. The Ninth Circuit deleted this language in McConnell, 778 F.2d

521. The holding, however, remained unchanged.
54 759 F.2d at 1406; 778 F.2d at 525.
55 See Birmingham v. Sogen-Swiss Int'l Corp. Retirement Plan, 718 F.2d 515, 523
(2d Cir. 1983); Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1356 (8th Cir.
1980).
56 This statement assumes that the courts seriously apply the Newman presumption.

It is possible that the Eaves test can overcome the Newman presumption by considering
any of the five factors that mitigate against the plaintiff as special circumstances rendering an award unjust. Newman, 390 U.S. at 402. Thus, if the district court balances the
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One district court that applies the Newman presumption favoring fee awards has expressly rejected the five-factor test. 57 This approach has the virtue of consistency, as it allows an almost automatic
fee award to prevailing plaintiffs without pretending to employ a
multi-factored balancing test. In contrast, four circuits have expressly rejected the argument that section 502(g)(1) should be analogized to the Fees Act, and have thus declined to apply the Newman
presumption favoring fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs. 58 These
courts simply examine each of the Eaves factors and balance them in
an attempt to achieve a just result. The factors are used as "guidelines to assist them in exercising their discretion." 5 9 The remaining
jurisdiction which employs the Eaves test has not accepted or rejected the Fees Act analogy,6 0 but its nonacceptance is nonetheless
tantamount to rejection because the court applies the factors without any presumption, like the courts that reject the Fees Act
standard.
The circuit that has not ruled on the applicability of the Eaves
test has been similarly silent on the question of an analogy to the
Fees Act. Its standard remains no more elaborate than one of
discretion. 6 1
2. PrevailingDefendants
Under the Fees Act, courts will not award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant unless the plaintiff's suit was either frivolous
or in bad faith. 6 2 Although few courts have explicitly applied this
standard to prevailing defendants under section 502(g)(1), 63 the
Eaves factors and determines that an award is unwarranted, it can deny the request using
the machinery of the presumption. However, this approach would practically nullify the
Newman presumption, just as a serious application of the presumption reduces the vitality of the five-factor analysis.
57 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
58 See Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1984); Ursic v.
Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983); Iron Workers Local 272 v. Bowen,
624 F.2d 1255, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1980); Gordon v. United States Steel Corp., 724 F.2d
106, 108 (10th Cir. 1983).
59 Iron Workers, 624 F.2d at 1266.
60 See Davidson v. Cook, 567 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Va. 1983), aft'd, 734 F.2d 10 (4th
Cir. 1984) (Fourth Circuit has not yet expressly ruled on this issue).
61 See Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 642 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 455 U.S. 72 (1982).
62 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
63 But see Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Hitchings Trucking,
Inc., 492 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Mich. 1980). The CentralStates court held as "a general rule
...a reasonable attorney's fee should be awarded to [defendants] who prevail in ERISA
actions." Id. at 909. The court analogized § 502(g)(1) to the Fees Act to support this
broad statement. Because under the Fees Act a prevailing defendant is not entitled to
an award as a general rule, one can conclude that the CentralStates court erred in adopting its position. However, since the court also found the substance of the plaintiff's
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Fees Act approach has influenced the reasoning of some courts. In
Marquardt v. North American Car Corp.,6 the Seventh Circuit upheld
the district court's determination that the prevailing defendant
should not receive an award of attorney's fees. Quoting Christiansburg6 5 extensively, the court reasoned that in both civil rights and
ERISA cases "the reason for awarding fees to defendants is to discourage frivolous suits, and in both instances it is important not to
punish plaintiffs whose actions fail even though they seemed reasonable at the outset." 66 The court held that because courts award fees
to prevailing defendants for the same reasons under ERISA and the
Civil Rights Act, the same standard should apply under each act.
The court also examined each Eaves factor, finding all of them "primarily relevant only to whether plaintiffs should be awarded attorneys' fees.... [A] court will seldom abuse its discretion by refusing
to award attorneys' fees... to a defendant." 67 Thus, the Eaves test,
although employed as a device to award fees to a prevailing plaintiff,
can rarely be used to assess fees against a losing plaintiff. The court
declined to name all the "specific circumstances [under which] fees
may be properly awarded to defendants," 68 but stated that the purpose of awarding fees to defendants is to discourage frivolous
suits. 69 Although the Marquardtapproach applies the Eaves test, the
70
result resembles the outcome under the Fees Act approach.
main claim to be "totally without merit," id. at 908, it is possible that the court viewed
the suit as frivolous or in bad faith, which would render an award to the defendant
proper under a Fees Act analogy and may serve to limit the scope of the court's "general
rule." Cf. Staats v. Ohio River Co., 570 F. Supp. 22, 25 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (holding, without reference to Fees Act, that prevailing defendant is not entitled to award of attorney's
fees absent bad faith on plaintiff's part), ajfd, 735 F.2d 1351 (3d Cir. 1984).
64 652 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1981).
65 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
66 Marquardt, 652 F.2d at 720 n.6.
67 Id. at 720-21.
68 Id. at 721 n.7.
69 Id. at 720 n.6.
70
The Ninth Circuit has also adopted the Marquardt rule. See Operating Eng'rs
Pension Trust v. Gilliam, 737 F.2d 1501, 1506 (9th Cir. 1984) (awarding fees to prevailing defendant because "the prosecution of this suit was grossly unfair"), Cf. Carpenters
S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1415-17 (9th Cir. 1984) (adopting Marquardt approach but rejecting Christiansburgstandard as too narrow, thus leaving flexibility to back away from Marquardtrule in a given case and award fees to defendant absent
bad faith or frivolousness).
In Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1984), the court reformulated the Marquardtapproach, acknowledging that a court will not assess fees against
a plaintiff absent frivolousness or bad faith on his part. It analogized § 502(g)(1) to the
Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982 & West 1986), and thereby
adopted "a modest presumption ... in favor of awarding reasonable attorney's fees to
the winning... defendant, unless the loser's position, while rejected by the court, had a
solid basis-more than merely not frivolous, but less than meritorious." Bittnei 728
F.2d at 830. The rule appears to require that a plaintiff's suit be more meritorious than
not frivolous, but in Chicago Painters & Decorators Pension, Health & Welfare, & De-
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The opposing view does not make use of the Fees Act approach, and assumes that applying the Eaves factors to a prevailing
defendant is just as likely to dictate an award as applying the factors
to a prevailing plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit briefly explained this position in dicta, stating that the Newman/Christiansburgbifurcated standard, which almost automatically awards fees to prevailing plaintiffs
but only awards them to prevailing defendants if the plaintiff's suit
was frivolous or in bad faith, is "inapposite to ERISA. ' '7 1 One district court has gone even further, using neither a bifurcated standard nor the Eaves test to hold that "[w]henever one side is entitled
to attorney's fees and costs in an action, the law is pretty clear that
the other side is entitled to the same things if the other side is the
prevailing party."' 72 Because the court is in the Ninth Circuit, which
73
has adopted the Newman presumption for prevailing plaintiffs, this
position is tantamount to an automatic award of fees to prevailing
defendants and has no other support in the case law.
Some courts automatically deny an award to the prevailing defendant if the defeated plaintiff is unable to pay it. In American Communications Association v. Retirement Planfor Employees of RCA Corp., 74
the court focussed on the losing plaintiff's ability to pay an award.
One plaintiff, an individual, was threatened with bankruptcy if assessed with the defendant's attorney's fees. On that basis, the court
denied the defendant's motion for fees as to that plaintiff. 75 However, the court deemed the plaintiff union able to pay and to have
known that a losing suit would entail this cost, and assessed fees

against

it.76

C. Application of Section 502(g)(1) to Nonprevailing Plaintiffs
Unlike the Fees Act, 77 section 502(g)(1)'s language does not referred Sav. Plan Trust Funds v. Karr Bros., 755 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1985), the
court employed both the Marquardtand Bitiner rules in denying an award to the prevailing defendant because the plaintiff's suit was not frivolous. The Christiansburgtest, see
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text, would provide the same result.
71
Iron Workers Local 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 n.24 (5th Cir. 1980).
For a recent discussion on the policyjustifications for applying the Eaves factors to either
prevailing party, see Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 258 (1st Cir.
1986).
72
Waggoner v. Dallaire, 570 F. Supp. 1168, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 767 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1374 (1986).
73
McConnell v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 778 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1985).
74
507 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Wishner v. St. Luke's Hosp. Center,
550 F. Supp. 1016, 1020-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that plaintiff's inability to pay
award is sufficient ground for denying request for fees).
75 American Communications, 507 F. Supp. at 923.
76 Id. at 924.
77 See supra text accompanying note 21.
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quire that courts award attorney's fees only to prevailing parties. 78
Nonetheless, nearly all courts have restricted ERISA awards to prevailing parties. In the leading case, Fase v. Seafarers Welfare & Pension
Plan,7 9 the Second Circuit denied a plaintiff's request for fees because he had not obtained relief under ERISA. The court held that
"[a]n altogether sufficient support for the court's decision not to
award attorney's fees under ERISA is that the attorney obtained no
relief under that statute."8 0 Although courts are not required to
deny a request for fees by wholly unsuccessful plaintiffs under this
rule, such denial will never constitute an abuse of discretion that is
reversible on appeal.8 1
In addition, the Supreme Court decision in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club 8 2 makes it unlikely that nonprevailing plaintiffs8 3 can recover
attorney's fees in ERISA suits. Ruckelshaus arose under section
307(f) of the Clean Air Act,8 4 which allows fee shifting "whenever
[the court] determines that such award is appropriate." The Court
held that a nonprevailing plaintiff was never entitled to an award.
The Court stated that before it would "conclude Congress abandoned this established principle that a successful party need not pay
its unsuccessful adversary's fees-rooted as it is in intuitive notions
of fairness and widely manifested in numerous different contexts-a
clear showing that this result was intended is required. '8 5 The five
member majority decided that Congress had omitted the word "prevailing" to avoid debate over the precise meaning of the term and
allow an award if the plaintiff had some degree of success in the
litigation. 8 6 Thus, a wholly unsuccessful plaintiff was not meant to
See supra text accompanying note 6.
589 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 116.
81 Courts have widely accepted this approach in dealing with requests for attorney's
fees by nonprevailing plaintiffs under ERISA. See Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 749 F.2d
494, 496 (8th Cir. 1984) (remanding request for fees until success on merits is shown);
Lodge v. Shell Oil Co., 747 F.2d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that lack of success on
merits "is sufficient support for the court's exercise of its discretion not to award...
fees"); Marquardt v. North Am. Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715, 718 n.2 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying attorney's fees even if defendant had prevailed on
merits). But see Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp., 469 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1979). In
Winpisinger, the court held that "[s]ince 'a reasonable attorneys' fee' may be allowed 'to
either party,' it is concluded that fees may be allowed.., for either the prevailing party
or the unsuccessful party." Id. at 785. The court awarded fees to a nonprevailing plaintiff class. This result probably does not survive Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680
(1983). See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 171-73 and
accompanying text for an argument as to why it should.
82
463 U.S. 680 (1983).
83 It is obviously even less likely that a culpable defendant would ever be awarded
fees, because of basic notions of fairness.
84 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0 (1982).
85 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 685.
86 Id. at 686-93.
78
79
80

1986]

ERISA: ATTORNEY'S FEES

1049

receive an award under any circumstances. Since the Ruckeishaus decision, one court has stated in an ERISA case that "it would be an
abuse of discretion for the district court to award attorney's fees to a
losing party, even though section [502](g)(1) does not in so many
87
words confine awards ... to winners."
II
ANALYSIS

Section 502(g)(1)'s underlying function and the inapplicability
of the private attorney general doctrine to ERISA make the Fees Act
standard an inappropriate one for prevailing plaintiffs. However, to
discourage frivolous suits courts should adopt the Fees Act standard
for prevailing ERISA defendants. Furthermore, the Eaves five-factor
test is a flawed method of analyzing requests for awards under section 502(g)(1). None of the Eaves factors comports with the function
of the ERISA fee-shifting provision or accepted fee-shifting principles, and some of the factors are unnecessary in light of the judiciary's equitable fee-shifting powers. Finally, nonprevailing plaintiffs
generally should not be granted awards, unless their cases created
new law or were lost on procedural grounds.
A.

Inappropriateness of the Fees Act Analogy for Determining
Attorney's Fees Awards to Prevailing Plaintiffs Under
Section 5 02(g)(1)

Courts should not apply the Newman presumption8 8 to prevailing plaintiffs because it is improper to draw an analogy between the
Fees Act and section 5 02(g)(1). This view is supported both by a
fair approximation of section 502(g)(1)'s underlying purpose and
the inapplicability to that section of the private attorney general theory, which is the primary justification for the Newman presumption.8 9
1. The Function of ERISA's Fee-Shifting Provision
The lack of legislative history makes it impossible to determine
the actual "intent" Congress had when it enacted section 502(g)(1).
Using the statutory language and the few judicial opinions commenting upon it as a starting point, however, this Note develops a
theory of what the function of the provision should be. The Note
concludes that, based on the language of section 502 (g)(1), the fee87 Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1984); see also
Phillips, Civil Litigation Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 49 Miss.

LJ. 241, 269 (1978) (arguing that § 502(g)(1) did not permit awards to unsuccessful
plaintiffs even before Ruckelshaus).
88 See supra text accompanying note 22.
89 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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shifting rationale that supports it, and the existing standards for
other statutes which protect financial interests, the section is a relatively weak fee-shifting provision. Thus the Fees Act standard,
which usually grants awards to prevailing plaintiffs, is inappropriate
under ERISA. Courts should award fees only under section
502(g)(1) to prevailing plaintiffs who would not otherwise bring
suit.
Congress enacted ERISA's enforcement provisions "to remove
jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to
have hampered effective enforcement . . .for recovery of benefits

91
due to participants." 90 No other useful legislative history exists.
Courts have speculated that the section seeks "to enable pension
claimants to obtain competent counsel and to distribute the economic burden of litigation in a fair manner" 92 and to "secure effective access to federal courts." 9 3 Taken literally, these brief
statements of purpose indicate that courts should award fees under
section 502(g)(1) only when a potential plaintiff would not otherwise bring an ERISA claim. Each statement demonstrates a desire
to ensure that the prohibitive costs of litigation will not bar potential
plaintiffs from filing ERISA suits.
Similar provisions in securities, trademark, and patent stat94
utes support the proposition that section 502(g)(1) is a relatively
weak fee-shifting provision compared to the Fees Act. Like these
areas of regulation, ERISA protects the financial interests of a
targeted, albeit large, group of investors. 95 In securities regulation,
courts award fees to the plaintiff only if the defendant's position on
the merits is frivolous or in bad faith. 9 6 Prevailing plaintiffs in patent and trademark cases must show fraud or malice by the defend-

90 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4655.

Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.

CODE

See supra text accompanying note 7.
Ford v. New York Cent. Teamsters Pension Fund, 506 F. Supp. 180, 182
(W.D.N.Y. 1980), aft'd, 642 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1981). Accord Carter v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 76 F.R.D. 565, 568 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
93 Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984). See also
Berger, supra note 19, at 310 ("statutory attorneys' fee provisions are intended to
achieve the fullest possible enforcement of the congressional policy embodied in the
underlying statutory scheme").
94
See Plant Variety Protection Act § 125, 7 U.S.C. § 2565 (1982) (allowing awards
of attorney's fees in "exceptional cases"); Trademark Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982)
(same; but only for prevailing parties); Patent Infringement Act § 1, 35 U.S.C. § 285
(1982) (same); Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982) (allowing for
fees to prevailing party "if the court believes the suit or the defense to have been without merit"); Trust Indenture Act § 315(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(e) (1982) (allowing award
of fees "having due regard to the merits and good faith of the claims or defenses made
by such party litigant").
95 See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
See Note, supra note 2, at 330-31.
96
91

92

1986]

ERISA: ATTORNEY'S FEES

1051

ant to receive a fee award. 97 Although the language of section
502(g)(1)98 allows courts more discretion than similar statutes,
courts should recognize that statutes protecting economic interests
typically contain weak fee-shifting provisions. 99
The language of section 502(g)(1) supports the rationale that
the section seeks to equalize the parties' financial strength. 100 This
rationale indicates that the provision functions merely to aid potential plaintiffs who otherwise could not bring suit-a weak class compared to their employers, plans, or unions. Awarding fees to
individual plaintiffs strengthens their position relative to ERISA defendants. Therefore, potential plaintiffs who are able to pay their
own attorney's fees should not receive awards under section
502(g)(1) because by definition the cost of counsel does not deter
them from bringing suit. Consequently, the class affected by section
502(g)(1) should not be the entire range of ERISA plaintiffs, but
only those whose financial position is so weak that they cannot bring
suit unless they receive an award of attorney's fees.
In contrast, the other four fee-shifting rationales do not justify
an award under section 502(g)(1). The "compensation rationale,"
which urges that a plaintiff should not have his damage award reduced by the amount of his attorney's fees, l0 1 is inconsistent with a
discretionary statute. 10 2 If Congress had intended that plaintiffs as a
matter of principle be fully compensated for the wrongs they suffer,
it would have made an award mandatory, as it has done in other
statutes. 103 The "indemnity rationale," which states that prevailing
parties should not have to bear the cost of vindicating their position, 10 4 is partially applicable to ERISA. Congress, by making the
awards discretionary, clearly intended that some prevailing plaintiffs
not pay to vindicate their positions. This rationale, however, does
not give any guidance as to who should be the fortunate plaintiffs.
All prevailing plaintiffs by definition are victorious on the merits, yet
section 502(g)(1) allows fee awards to only a portion of them. Stand97

98
99

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 6.

See supra note 94.
Professor Rowe has explained this "relative financial strength" rationale. Rowe,
supra note 32, at 663-65. When one class of litigants is in a weak financial position vis-avis its adversary class, courts can shift fees to help the weaker class litigate, and to prevent the stronger class from using the judicial process to exhaust its opponent's resources. Id.
101 Id. at 657-59.
102
Id. at 658.
1o
See supra note 5. Under the language of § 502(g)(1), some plaintiffs should receive awards while others should not.
104
See supra text accompanying note 32.
100
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ing alone, the indemnity rationale does not substantially contribute
to the search for a proper standard under section 502(g)(1).
Section 502(g)(1)'s legislative history does not indicate that
Congress provided for awards of attorney's fees as a punitive measure. The legislative intent and judicial interpretations merely indicate that the section seeks to assist parties who would not otherwise
bring suit.10 5 One commentator has accurately concluded in this
context that "[n]o blame attaches to such litigation, and it does not
call for strong deterrence. Any fee shifting against an unsuccessful
party in such a situation should rest on grounds other than punishment or deterrence."'' 0 6
2.

The Private Attorney General Doctrine

The private attorney general doctrine allows courts to award
attorney's fees to plaintiffs who take on the burden of conducting
public interest litigation. The doctrine evolved as an exception to
the American Rule' 0 7 of fee shifting and aims to "encourage private
08
parties to bring actions that would advance the public interest"'
09
and to effect equity between the parties.
After Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,I 1 0 the courts could no longer apply the
private attorney general doctrine absent statutory authorization.
105

"[N]othing in the language of section 1132(g)(1) suggests that an award of attor-

ney's fees .

.

. serves the same purpose as awarding punitive damages . ..

[and] the

courts have not interpreted section 1132(g)(1) as if its intent were punitive." Bittner v.
Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 828 (7th Cir. 1984). Cf. Ursic v. Bethlehem
Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Where... the award is statutory, the assessment of a counsel fee is to some extent a penalty for violating the law."). This statement
is not supported by the legislative history, and is inconsistent with the generally accepted view of § 502(g)(1)'s purpose. It also ignores the fact that ERISA contains several punitive measures, both civil and criminal, in its other sections. See infra notes 15562 and accompanying text.
106 Rowe, supra note 32, at 661. This theory does not apply to plaintiffs, who may
have fees assessed against them as a punitive measure if their suits are frivolous or in
bad faith. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. Courts should allow every good
faith defendant to make the plaintiff prove his case, but deter potential plaintiffs from
initiating vexatious litigation.
107
See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
108
Note, Implementing the Incentive Purpose of the Private Attorney General Exception, 60
WASH. L. REv. 489, 491 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implementing the Incentive Purpose]. The Supreme Court has explained that a plaintiff bringing a suit under a civil
rights statute acts "not for himself alone but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful plaintiffs were
routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a
position to advance the public interest .. " Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390
U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (footnote omitted) (granting attorney's fees to plaintiff who enjoined defendants from funding discriminatory restaurants). See also Note, supra note 2,
at 284-86 (summarizing private attorney general doctrine); Note, Awards of Attorneys' Fees
to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, 96 HARv. L. REv. 677, 679-81 (1983) (same).
109 See Note, Implementing the Incentive Purpose, supra note 108, at 494-95.
110 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See supra text accompanying note 16.
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Congress passed the Fees Act so that courts could continue to implement the private attorney general doctrine in civil rights cases.I 1 I
The Newman presumption favoring fee awards is thus applied under
2
the Fees Act to permit implementation of the doctrine."1
An ERISA plaintiff does not act as a private attorney general.
The statute "was enacted to protect individuals who failed to receive
an anticipated pension because terms of the pension plan denied
benefits to workers ... or because the company ended operations
3
with inadequate funds set aside to pay promised benefits.""1
Before ERISA,
[e]mployees were often denied benefits because of unreasonably
stringent rules governing participation and vesting in the plan or,
in certain cases, because of the arbitrary application of otherwise
equitable rules. At times, plans imposed conditions on benefits
that bore no reasonable relationship to the plans' purposes. In
some cases, eligibility requirements were changed without notice
to employees or a grace period, or such changes were applied ret114
roactively to previously-filed applications for benefits.
The interest protected by ERISA is purely economic. In contrast,
civil rights laws, the source of the private attorney general doctrine,
protect constitutional rights of the highest order."X5 Economic wellbeing, though clearly important, is not considered a constitutional
right. 1 6 The private attorney general doctrine was not conceived as
a vehicle for awarding fees to litigants who enforce nonconstitutional rights, and it has not often been so employed." 7 The docIll
"[I]n Alyeska, the United States Supreme Court... ruled that only Congress, and
not the courts, could specify which laws were important enough to merit fee shifting
under the 'private attorney general' theory.... This bill.., is an appropriate response
to the Alyeska decision. It is limited to cases arising under our civil rights laws ... ." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 22, at 4 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5911-12. See also Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1979) (explaining that Congress enacted Fees Act to assist private attorneys general in recovering
fees).
112 SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs at 5912.
113 Sickles, Introduction: The Significance and Complexity of ERISA, 17 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 205, 206 (1975).
114
Hutchinson, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Origins and Objectives, 14
FORUM 611, 614 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
115 The fourteenth amendment's prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, and religion are the most obvious examples. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
116 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (holding that due process clause of
fourteenth amendment does not protect right to charge whatever market would bear for
product); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA (1938)
(indicating that fourteenth amendment primarily protects political process rather than
commercial transactions).
117 The major exception to this rule is in the antitrust field, where a few courts have
equated the plaintiffs with private attorneys general. "The Sherman Act is designed to
promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his
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trine exists "to alleviate the patent unfairness in making a citizen
incur a heavy financial burden in order to realize a clearly defined
18
constitutional right."'
In Iron Workers Local 272 v. Bowen, 1 9 the Fifth Circuit refused to
apply the private attorney general doctrine to ERISA plaintiffs, explaining that
[t]he policies underlying ERISA are certainly important ones, but
they simply do not rise to the level of assuring that all citizens are
accorded their civil rights.... [T]he need for attorneys' fees as an
enforcement incentive is less under ERISA than the... civil rights
statutes. Plaintiffs suing under the latter statutes are "private attorneys general" in the sense that they seek injunctive relief to
vindicate important public rights ....

Plaintiffs under Title I of

ERISA may be seeking injunctive relief for the benefit of all the
participants and beneficiaries of a particular plan, but they may
also be seeking damages on behalf of their plan or simply the recovery of benefits from the plan that are due them alone....
Thus, incentives in the form of attorneys' fees are.., less necessary to insure that the statute is enforced. 12 0
rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who protects the
public's interest." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
3346, 3358 (1985) (explaining importance of Sherman Act's treble damages provision)
(quoting American Safety Equip. Corp. v.J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir.
1968)). However, courts do not have to rely upon the private attorney general doctrine
to award fees in antitrust cases, because such awards are mandatory rather than discretionary. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Furthermore, although ERISA affects millions of
individuals, it does not affect the nation's collective economy in the manner of the antitrust law.
Some courts have also extended the private attorney general doctrine into the area
of environmental litigation. See Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1237-46 (1973). However, environmental
litigation can affect the entire population of a locality, while ERISA suits benefit only the
particular plan's members. These examples show that courts have extended the private
attorney general doctrine to nonconstitutional rights only when societal, rather than individual, rights are affected.
118
Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "PrivateAttorney General":JudicialGreen Light to
PrivateLitigation in the Public Interest, 24 HATINGS LJ. 733, 738 (1973). Accord, e.g., Souza
v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 1138 (1st Cir.) (justifying private attorney general doctrine
on basis that "the protection of ... constitutional rights depended on the efforts of
skilled attorneys"), vacated and remandedforfurtherconsiderationin light of Alyeska, 423 U.S.
809 (1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503"F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1974) (applying doctrine because plaintiffs "vindicated constitutional rights strongly favored by congressional policy"), vacated and remandedforfurther consideration in light of Alyeska, 421 U.S. 982 (1975);
Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143, 144-46 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing doctrine only
in terms of constitutional rights); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th
Cir. 1974) (employing doctrine when plaintiff enforced statute that "expresse[d] a
strong policy of vindicating federal constitutional rights").
119 624 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1980).
120
Id. at 1265-66 (footnotes omitted). For similar explanations of why the Fees Act
is not analogous to § 502(g)(1), see Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820,
829-30 (7th Cir. 1984) (pension plan participants do not constitute a "vulnerable
group" like racial minorities); Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 592
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The other circuits that reject the Fees Act analogy also implicitly adopt this view. 12 ' Furthermore, courts have denied awards
under the Fees Act to prevailing plaintiffs, in spite of the liberal Newman presumption, where courts found that the plaintiff did not act as
a private attorney general or that the plaintiff had adequate incentives for his action independent of the Fees Act. 12 2 Likewise, plaintiffs in ERISA actions are not acting as private attorneys general
seeking to protect some broad public right, and they may have adequate resources to bring ERISA actions without relying on the fee123
shifting provision.
Even if an ERISA plaintiff properly could be characterized as a
private attorney general, courts should not apply the Newman presumption to section 502(g)(1). The Fees Act is only applicable to
civil rights cases. 12 4 Congress incorporated the Newman presumption into the Fees Act because it wanted to ensure that civil rights
plaintiffs would almost always be awarded attorney's fees. 125 If a
court analogizes the Fees Act to section 502(g)(1), it implicitly holds
that Congress equated the rights protected by ERISA with civil
rights, because it granted both classes of plaintiffs the same protection. The Court's decision in Alyeska,12 6 however, stands for the
proposition that Congress, rather than the judiciary, must make major fee-shifting decisions. Without a legislative mandate courts
should not equate economic interests with constitutional rights for
fee-shifting purposes.
B.

The Fees Act Approach Should Apply to Prevailing
Defendants Under Section 5 02(g)(1)

Although courts should not adopt the Fees Act approach for
determining awards to prevailing plaintiffs, courts best fulfill section
(9th Cir. 1984) (WallaceJ., c6ncurring) (refusing to analogize § 502(g)(1) to civil rights
statute, citing Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1415-16 (9th
Cir. 1984)); see also Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 259 (1st Cir.
1986) (suggesting ERISA plaintiffs are not private attorneys general).
121
See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
122
See supra note 25. See also Note, supra note 25, at 335-38 (arguing that, contrary to
some authority, plaintiff need not benefit others beside himself to qualify as private attorney general).
123
Courts requiring a public benefit should never find an ERISA plaintiff to be a
private attorney general because an ERISA plaintiff primarily benefits persons associated with his pension plan by acquiring an interpretation of a particular plan provision.
See supra text accompanying notes 113-20. Courts holding any Fees Act plaintiff to be a
private attorney general do so because by enforcing his own civil rights, he vindicates an
important congressional priority. See Note, supra note 2, at 284-85. An ERISA plaintiff
does not achieve the same result. See supra text accompanying note 120.
124
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
125
See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
126
See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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502(g)(1)'s function by adopting the Fees Act approach for awards
to prevailing defendants in ERISA suits. That approach is more appropriate for application to ERISA defendants than the Eaves fivefactor test.
It is unclear whether a prevailing defendant must show bad
faith by the plaintiff to receive an award under the Fees Act or
whether a showing of frivolousness is sufficient.' 27 However, under
either of these standards it is more difficult for defendants to receive
fees than under the Eaves five-factor test. 12 8 This is a proper result,
given the function of section 502(g)(1) as facilitating ERISA suits
that plaintiffs otherwise would not bring. 12 9 An unpredicted defeat
on the merits resulting in liability for the defendant's attorney's fees
would easily discourage potential plaintiffs from enforcing their
rights under the statute. Few lawsuits are guaranteed winners.
Thus, if courts do not adopt a bad faith or frivolousness standard
for prevailing defendants, potential ERISA plaintiffs will hesitate to
bring suits. At the same time, such a standard will discourage suits
that are frivolous or in bad faith. By allowing courts to award fees to
either the plaintiff or the defendant in an ERISA action,' 3 0 Congress
surely envisioned that prevailing defendants would sometimes receive awards. However, courts should limit awards of attorney's
fees to prevailing defendants by applying the Fees Act approach to
protect the overriding purposes of the fee-shifting provision.
The Christiansburgfrivolousness standard' 3 ' is more appropriate
than a strict bad faith standard.' 32 Although applying the frivolousness standard might make potential plaintiffs less inclined to bring
suit, the standard is nevertheless appropriate because very few frivolous cases are brought in good faith. Cases may exist where the
plaintiff believes the suit has a reasonable basis under the law when
in fact it does not. However, the Christiansburgtest allows for such
cases by not holding the plaintiff liable for fees unless the suit
clearly becomes unreasonable during the course of the litigation.
Thus, if the suit is not frivolous at the outset, courts assess no fees.
See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text; see also Gray v. New England Tel. &
127
Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 259-60 (1st Cir. 1986) (denying defendant's request for fees
because no bad faith despite frivolous suit).
Under the Eaves test, courts may award fees to a prevailing defendant even
128
though the plaintiff brought an action in good faith if, for example, the plaintiff could
pay the award. See supra text accompanying note 39.
129 See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
130
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1982) ("court... may allow... fee... to either party").
131
See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
132
If courts adopt a bad faith standard, § 502(g)(1) would become superfluous for
prevailing defendants because courts can equitably assess attorney's fees against bad
faith litigants even in the absence of any statutory provision. See Christiansburg,434 U.S.
at 419; see also infra notes 144-48.
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Although it is hard to predict victory with accuracy, a potential ERISA plaintiff should rely on the advice of his attorney that his suit
has some reasonable basis under the law and that courts will not
assess attorney's fees against him. Indeed, in many cases an ERISA
suit provides an easier determination that a claim is reasonable at
the outset, because these suits involve such factual issues as whether
a fiduciary complied with plan provisions, rather than a civil rights
claim, which may present more difficult questions. 13 3 Consequently,
34
the frivolousness standard will discourage few reasonable suits.
Of course, where courts find the suit initially frivolous, the good
faith plaintiff could ask the judge to assess the award against the
135
plaintiff's attorney as a sanction.
It is not inconsistent for courts to reject the Fees Act approach
for prevailing ERISA plaintiffs while accepting it for prevailing defendants. Unlike the Fees Act, ERISA's legislative history does not
compel application of the Newman presumption. The Fees Act's policy, which is to encourage private enforcement of the civil rights
laws, requires that courts should almost automatically award prevailing plaintiffs attorney's fees and award fees to prevailing defendants
only for suits brought frivolously or in bad faith.' 3 6 In contrast, section 502(g)(1)'s function is to facilitate ERISA suits plaintiffs could
not otherwise bring,13 7 and does not require a virtual guarantee that
courti will award plaintiffs fees. Its function does, however, imply
that courts should not award defendants fees in actions brought in
good faith.
Few courts, however, have adopted a bad faith or frivolousness
standard for prevailing defendants under ERISA. 138 Instead, some
courts apply the Marquardt court's application of the Eaves test.
Under this approach, prevailing defendants rarely receive awards,
reflecting the result under the frivolousness test. 13 9 The opposing
view, that courts should earnestly apply the Eaves five-factor test to
133
If the Christiansburgcourt was willing to impose a frivolousness standard on civil
rights plaintiffs, it would presumably be even less apprehensive in applying it to an ERISA plaintiff because ERISA achieves only nonconstitutional policy objectives.
134 In applying this standard, "it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable." Christiansburg,
434 U.S. at 421-22.
135 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows courts to impose "an
appropriate sanction.., including a reasonable attorney's fee" upon an errant counsel.
Use of this sanction has been increasing. See generally Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New
FederalRule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985).
136 See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
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prevailing defendants,1 40 discourages potential plaintiffs from
bringing suits having a reasonable basis under the law and therefore
conflicts with section 502(g)(1)'s function. Finally, the view that
courts can award fees to a prevailing defendant only if the plaintiff is
able to pay them1 4 1 is inappropriate to analysis of fee shifting under
section 502(g) (1). This approach forces financially secure plaintiffs
to pay fees in suits they lose, even if reasonable and brought in good
faith, and thus discourages potentially meritorious actions. Conversely, it affords penniless plaintiffs the luxury of suing for harassment purposes with impunity.
C.

Courts Should Not Apply the Eaves Five-Factor Test to
Determine Attorney's Fees Awards Under Section
502(g)(1)

The five-factor test is an unhelpful method for determining the
appropriateness of awards to prevailing plaintiffs in ERISA actions.
Any test to determine the appropriateness of an award must be consistent with an approximation of Congress's intent in enacting section 502(g)(1), 14 2 and should be justifiable by general principles of
fee shifting. 14 3 Furthermore, if the test only codifies existing rules,
it adds nothing to the development of the law.
None of the Eaves factors meets these guidelines. The first factor courts consider under the Eaves test, "the degree of the offending parties' culpability or bad faith," 14 4 is superfluous because even
absent any statute courts may shift fees if bad faith exists. Consideration of the defendant's bad faith is unnecessary with a statutory feeshifting provision. 14 5 Thus, there is no need to formalize the consideration of a defendant's bad faith 46 in a test under section
502(g)(1), because if bad faith is present, courts can shift attorney's
fees under their inherent power. At least one court has adopted this
position, 14 7 and modified the Eaves test to exclude any consideration of the defendant's bad faith.' 48 Furthermore, this factor is imSee supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 39.
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
The doctrine of bad faith takes into account the possibility that some, but not all,
of the defendant's conduct may have been in bad faith. Courts should only award fees to
cover those expenses which resulted from the defendant's bad faith. See Mallor, supra
note 18, at 638.
147
Baeten v. Van Ess, 474 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
148
Id. at 1332. See also Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344,
1356 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that courts have discretion at common law to award attorney's fees against losing parties who have acted in bad faith and that there is presump140
141
142
143
144
145
146
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proper because considering the degree of a defendant's culpability
uses fee shifting as a punitive measure. Similarly, the fifth Eaves fac-

tor, "the relative merits of the parties' position"' 149 when applied to
a case where the plaintiff has prevailed, also requires investigating
the defendant's culpability. 150

An inquiry into culpability is improper because it suggests that
courts will deny a fee award to an otherwise worthy plaintiff upon a
finding that the losing defendant was "nonculpable." This denial is
inappropriate because the function of section 502(g)(1) is to facilitate the prosecution of suits which plaintiffs would not otherwise
bring. 151 Application of the degree of culpability factor would deter
some plaintiffs from bringing suit in close cases, thereby discouraging potentially meritorious actions. Conversely under this approach
potential plaintiffs able and willing to finance litigation absent fee
shifting would still get an award if courts found the defendant's position meritless. The degree of the defendant's culpability has no
bearing on the plaintiff's financial resources and is therefore un-

helpful in determining the propriety of fee awards under section
502(g)(1).
The second Eaves factor, "the degree of the ability of the of15 2
fending parties to personally satisfy an award of attorneys fees,"'
concerns situations where the fees "would be paid not out of the
pockets of the people responsible for the denial of benefits to the
plaintiff-the plan's trustees, for example-but out of the plan assets themselves, thus hurting the plan beneficiaries."' 15 3 This concern is misplaced. Section 5 02(g)(1) aims to facilitate ERISA
litigation by removing the burden of paying attorney's fees from
plaintiffs who might not otherwise bring suit. The ultimate source
of payment should be subordinate to the goal of enabling plaintiffs
to bring suit. Furthermore, as the Eaves test acknowledges in its
fourth factor, an individual plaintiff's action may benefit an entire
group of plan participants, either through acquiring delinquent
funds or establishing a favorable point of law. In these cases it is
proper to assess fees to the plan if the culpable defendant is unable
to pay. Even if a particular suit benefits only the plaintiff, a general
tion against interpreting statute so as to render it superfluous); Bugher v. Consolidated
X-Ray Serv. Corp., 705 F.2d 1426, 1436 (5th Cir. 1983) (assessing fees against party
who had acted in bad faith when award was notjustifiable under § 502(g)(1)), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3524 (1985); supra note 132 (same analysis in context of Fees Act).
149 See supra text accompanying note 39.
150 See Marquardt v. North Am. Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715, 718, 720 (7th Cir. 1981)
(defining merits of defendant's position in terms of his culpability).
151 See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
152
See supra text accompanying note 39.
153 Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1984).
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rule assessing fees to the plan if the defendant cannot pay is ultimately beneficial to all plan participants because it enables each of
them to bring his own action without concern for the defendant's
154
financial condition.
The third Eaves factor, "whether or not an award of attorneys
fees against the offending parties would deter other persons acting
under similar circumstances," ' 15 5 does not reflect Congress's intent
in enacting section 502(g)(1) and cannot be justified by an accepted
rationale of fee shifting. Fee shifting is punitive when employed to
deter conduct.1 56 However, some mechanisms may deter conduct
without being considered punitive. 157 ERISA allows for compensatory damage awards,1 5 8 apart from fee shifting under section
502 (g)(1). Compensatory damages, along with the necessity of bearing one's own costs if a suit is brought, deter conduct violative of
ERISA without being punitive. Additionally, the statute's punitive
provisions1 59 and its strict fiduciary standard 160 also deter such conduct. Because deterrence exists absent section 502(g)(1), using that
section as a further deterrent only adds an extra penalty for improper conduct. Neither punitive nor deterrent fee shifting is justified absent bad faith, 16 1 and Congress did not intend that section
162
502(g)(1) be applied punitively.
The fourth Eaves factor, "the amount of benefit conferred on
members of the pension plan as a whole,"' 163 resembles the established common fund or common benefit doctrine. A court may, at
164
equity, assess fees to a class that benefits from the litigation.
Thus, if a common benefit results from an ERISA suit, courts can
shift the cost of attorney's fees from the plaintiff to the benefitted
class independent of section 502(g)(1). Applying the common benefit doctrine reflects the statute's purpose and enables qualifying potential plaintiffs, regardless of their financial status, to bring ERISA
154
155
156

Rowe, supra note 32, at 661.
See supra text accompanying note 39.
See Mallor, supra note 18, at 652; Rowe, supra note 32, at 661.
157
The tort of negligence, for example, is thought to deter careless conduct by exacting purely compensatory damages from those who commit it. See W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 25-26 (5th ed. 1984).

158
159
160
161

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982).
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132(i) (1982) (administrative assessment of civil penalties).

29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1982).

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 39. Courts appear to most commonly use this factor as a device
that cuts against the defendant rather than the plaintiff. "The benefit conferred on
other plan participants... is an important consideration in evaluating the merit of the
plaintiff's case." Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1984).
164 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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actions.' 65 The Eaves test, however, which treats the creation of a
common benefit as an opportunity to shift fees to the defendant,
results in unjust enrichment to the benefitted class. 166 Proper application of the common benefit rationale offers no justification for
shifting a plaintiff's attorney's fees to a defendant. One court apparently agrees and has adopted the Eaves test omitting the common
benefit factor.167
The Eaves court addressed the common fund issue, stating that
"a specific statutory authorization of attorneys fees[ ] will, in most
cases, eliminate the necessity which gave rise to the common fund
exception."' 68 However, as the court admitted,' 69 the common
fund doctrine may still apply to ERISA plaintiffs when they fail to
receive awards under section 502(g)(1).1 70 Because section
502(g)(1) is a weak fee-shifting provision which should operate only
to facilitate suits which plaintiffs could not otherwise bring, the statute never applies when the common benefit theory makes an award
proper. Nothing in ERISA indicates that Congress intended to preempt the common benefit doctrine. If that equitable doctrine may
be used by courts to award attorney's fees, the plaintiff may bring
his action without individually paying attorney's fees, thus making
section 502(g)(1) unnecessary.
D.

Nonprevailing Plaintiffs Should Receive Awards in Limited
Circumstances
In enacting section 502(g)(1), Congress did not intend to en-

165
One court has applied the common fund doctrine to an ERISA case, but found
on the facts that a common benefit was not conferred, so an award was inappropriate.
Fase v. Seafarers Welfare & Pension Plan, 589 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1978). The court implied that if a common benefit is conferred, the common benefit doctrine should be used
in an ERISA case.
166
Of course, when the defendant is the pension plan that plaintiff is a member of
and the plan members are benefitted by the plaintiff's action, assessing fees to the defendant is proper under the common benefit doctrine. The plaintiff, as a member of the
benefitted class, would pay at least some fraction of the fees under this approach. However, assessing fees to those defendants not benefitted or in a class with the plaintiff, as
the fourth Eaves factor allows, distorts the common benefit doctrine.
167
Baeten v. Van Ess, 474 F. Supp. 1324, 1332 (E.D. Wis. 1979). Although the
court offered no explanation for the omission, it similarly did not consider the defendant's degree of bad faith, on the grounds that such an analysis was unnecessary in light
of a court's equity powers. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
168
587 F.2d at 464.
169
Id. at 465.
170
Commentators suggest that "where plaintiff's attorney succeeds in having a plan
provision declared invalid under ERISA, a court may, and perhaps should, under Section 502(g) of ERISA, exercise its discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees from
the fund on the grounds that the class as a whole was benefited." Kroll & Tauber, Compendium of ERISA and FiduciaryLitigation: The Breadth ofJurisdictionand Available Relief 38
INST. ON FED. TAx'N 4-1, 4-31 (ERISA Supp. 1980).
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courage suits against defendants who did not violate ERISA. These
suits do not vindicate any of the policies the statute is designed to
implement. 71 In some meritorious actions, however, the plaintiff
loses on procedural grounds or because the court makes new law.
By enacting section 5 02(g)(1) Congress may have intended to promote these suits. Therefore, although awarding fees to nonprevailing plaintiffs "would require federal courts to make sensitive,
difficult, and ultimately highly subjective determinations," 17 2 courts
should attempt to determine when fee awards to nonprevailing
plaintiffs are appropriate. Awards would be appropriate in the types
of situations just mentioned, but not where the action was meritless
73
or filed to harass the defendant.
III
PROPOSAL FOR PREVAILING PLAINTIFFS

Courts considering whether to award attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff should first examine whether the defendant acted in
bad faith or if the plaintiff's suit created a common fund or benefit
for a wider class. 174 If so, equity empowers fee shifting absent section 5 02(g) (1).175 If neither of these equitable doctrines applies, the
second tier of analysis should be to determine whether ERISAjustifies an award.
Section 502(g)(1)'s function is to facilitate meritorious ERISA
litigation that plaintiffs would not otherwise bring because of the
cost of retaining an attorney. Consequently, courts should award attorney's fees to those plaintiffs who could not bring their action but
for the knowledge that if they won on the merits courts would award
them fees. To make this determination, the court should consider
whether a reasonable plaintiff would have brought the suit if no
award of attorney's fees was possible. Specifically, at the close of the
litigation, the court should compare the damage award with the
amount of attorney's fees 176 charged to the plaintiff. 177 Economically rational plaintiffs will not bring suit if the action's cost is exSee supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983).
173
Id. There appears to be no basis for distinguishing the Clean Air Act from ERISA for purposes of awarding fees to nonprevailing plaintiffs. The fact that the government would have reimbursed the plaintiff in Ruckelshaus, where the EPA was the
defendant, actually cuts against a nonprevailing ERISA plaintiff, who would most likely
collect his fees from a private individual.
174
One court has made such a determination in awarding fees. See supra note 165.
175
See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
176 For a discussion of the amount of money attorneys should reasonably charge
their clients, see generally Berger, supra note 19; Comment, Calculation of a Reasonable
Award of Attorneys' Fees Under the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 331
(1980). The same set of factors is generally considered regardless of the statute which
171

172
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pected to exceed its return.' 78 Courts should always grant a
plaintiff's request for attorney's fees if the fee is equal to or greater
than the damage award. Easy cases under the proposed test include
suits where the damage award far exceeds the attorney's fees and
thus courts would deny the plaintiff's request, and suits where the
fees greatly exceed the damages and thus courts would grant the
plaintiff's request. In close cases, 179 when it was probably difficult
for the plaintiff to determine whether or not his damages would exceed his attorney's fee, the court should grant the plaintiff's request.
This will prevent the proposal from having a chilling effect on potential plaintiffs whose expected costs are close to their expected
recovery. Because section 5 02(g)(1) aims to encourage suits which
plaintiffs would not otherwise bring, courts should err on the side of
allowing more ERISA plaintiffs to bring suit. In effect, under this
proposal courts should grant the plaintiff's request for attorney's
fees unless the damage award substantially exceeds the attorney's
fees.
The "relative financial strength of the parties" rationale of fee
shifting justifies this proposal. 180 Courts would only award fees to
that weak class of potential plaintiffs which normally could not afford to bring suit. More important, this test would implement the
statute's function of facilitating litigation enforcing the underlying
rights furnished by ERISA. The proposal, if adopted, would mean
that courts would deny fee awards to many prevailing plaintiffs. For
example, plaintiffs who can make a contingency fee arrangement
shifted the fees. See, e.g., Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673-78 (3d Cir. 1983)
(giving factors to be considered in evaluating reasonableness of attorney's fees).
177 A potential plaintiff obviously also considered his chances for success on the
merits when deciding whether or not to bring suit. However, since awards of attorney's
fees are almost never granted to nonprevailing plaintiffs, see supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text, judges need not consider the plaintiff's initial prediction of victory. A
plaintiff must realize that if he loses the suit, he will not recover his attorney's fees.
When deciding whether or not to bring suit on the basis of § 502(g)(1), the plaintiff
should only consider the financial ramifications if he wins the suit.
178 Absent the possibility of a fee award, a plaintiff will bring suit only if "his expected judgement would be at least as large as his legal costs." Shavell, Suit, Settlement,
and Triak A TheoreticalAnalysis UnderAlternative Methodsfor the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 55, 58 (1982).

Because all plaintiffs are not economically rational, the proposed test is overinclusive because it awards attorney's fees to parties who would bring a suit regardless of its
potential financial reward. Although § 502(g)(1) was not designed to protect these
plaintiffs, it is too cumbersome for the judiciary to undertake the task of sorting them
out. Such requests should be denied, except if the trial testimony reveals conclusively
that the plaintiff would have brought suit even if no fee-shifting provision existed.
179
For instance, when the damage award is $5,000 and the attorney's bill is $4,000,
courts should make an award to the prevailing plaintiff. The line drawing problems of
what constitutes a "close case" are naturally a function of the judge's discretion under
the statute.
180 See Rowe, supra note 32, at 663-65.
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with their attorney do not need to rely on section 5 0 2(g)(1), as they
already are able to "secure effective access to federal courts." 18 1
This result is proper because ERISA protects a purely financial interest and neither section 502(g)(1)'s language nor its legislative
history suggest a rule that would grant awards almost automatically
to prevailing plaintiffs.18 2 If Congress intended to guarantee fee
awards to prevailing ERISA plaintiffs, it would not have left the decision to the discretion of the court, or at least would have, as in the
Fees Act,' 8 3 provided guidance as to an appropriate standard.
CONCLUSION

None of the existing methods of determining when to award
attorney's fees under ERISA is logically and practically suited to its
purpose. Courts that analogize section 502(g)(1)'s application to
prevailing plaintiffs to the Fees Act ignore Congress's intent.
Although Congress mandated a virtually automatic fee award for
plaintiffs in civil rights actions, such an approach is inappropriate in
ERISA actions.
Other courts employ the Eaves five-factor test to determine the
appropriateness of an award. However, several of the Eaves factors
merely restate the court's inherent equity powers to shift attorney's
fees. Furthermore, the factors do not comport with section
502(g)(1)'s status as a nonpunitive fee-shifting provision based on
the language of ERISA and generally accepted fee-shifting
principles.
Standards for fee shifting involving prevailing defendants are
different. The Fees Act approach to prevailing defendants, which
rarely permits courts to shift fees to the plaintiff, is appropriate
under section 502(g)(1). Defendants should recover attorney's fees
only if the plaintiff files a suit that is frivolous or for the purpose of
harassment.
Section 502(g)(1) is best viewed as a weak fee-shifting provision, intended merely to facilitate suits which enforce other provisions of ERISA. Courts should only apply the section when an
award of attorney's fees would encourage potential plaintiffs who
would not otherwise bring suit to do so.
Mark Howard Berlind

181
182
183

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90-126 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

